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Abstract
Think tanks, or policy advice institutions, are civil society organizations producing and delivering social analysis to policy-
makers and the wider public. Their aim is to influence policy in a given direction. Compared tomost other civil society orga-
nizations, they hold relatively privileged positions, both in terms of wealth (on average bigger budgets and staffs), political
influence (their very raison d’être), knowledge (educational level of the staff), and social networks. Thus, it seems beyond
dispute that think tanks adhere to the elite of civil society. This article focuses on think tanks’ negative self-identification,
on their reluctance to accept labels. Not only are think tanks unwilling to take on the elite designation, some of them also
deny being part of civil society, and some go one step further in denying identification with the think tank community.
These multiple denials are expected if we recall Pierre Bourdieu’s observation that “all aristocracies define themselves as
being beyond all definition” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 316). The analysis focuses on how this definitional ambiguity is discursively
constructed. Think-tankers are often described as situated in an interstitial space between such fields as politics, civil so-
ciety, media, market, and academia. While this intermediary position is the source of their unique role as converters of
various forms of capital, it also complicates the identity formation of think tanks. The argument is illustrated by Polish think
tanks and the data consists of original interviews with think tank leaders. The article provides a novel perspective on think
tanks and on civil society elites.
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1. Introduction
This article analyzes think tanks as a civil society elite.
Think tanks, or policy advice institutions, are civil society
organizations producing and delivering social analysis to
policymakers and the wider public. Their aim is to influ-
ence policy in a given direction but one that, allegedly,
is not defined by any vested interests. The claim to inde-
pendence and orientation at influencing policymaking is
central for think tanks (Jezierska & Sörbom, 2020). The
distinctive traits of think tanks are drawn from their in-
terstitial position between other fields (Medvetz, 2012a,
2012b), such as academia, politics, media, market, and
civil society. This in-between position leads to a combina-
tion of various qualifications, functions, and professional
models in these organizations. Operating on the verge of
other fields, think tanks perform boundary work convert-
ing capital from the other fields. Compared tomost other
civil society organizations, think tanks are relatively priv-
ileged, both in terms of wealth (on average bigger bud-
gets), political influence (their very raison d’être), knowl-
edge (educational level of the staff), and social networks.
As such, it seems beyond dispute that think tanks belong
to the elite of civil society.
This article focuses on the self-identification of think
tanks. How do they identify with respect to the think
tank community, the broader surrounding civil society,
and their elite position in it? The argument is that think
tanks, qua civil society elite, define themselves in neg-
ative terms. Their identity is built on three types of de-
nial: of their place in civil society; of being a think tank;
and of constituting an elite. While most think-tankers
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agree that, at least formally, they belong to civil soci-
ety, they clearly mark their difference with respect to
other civil society organizations. They also negate be-
longing to a civil society elite. Even more puzzling is that
some think tanks decline the definition of their organi-
zation as a think tank. I argue that these denials are
rather indicative of elites if we recall Pierre Bourdieu’s
observation that “all aristocracies define themselves as
being beyond all definition” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 316).
This negative identification is interpreted as a logical
consequence of think tanks’ interstitial positioning be-
tween different fields, a source of their elevated status.
Definitional ambiguity, even though frustrating for schol-
ars of this phenomenon, actually suits these organiza-
tions well in the performance of their functions. To sub-
stantiate these claims, the article builds on interviews
with Polish think-tankers. While studies of Polish civil so-
ciety abound, it is still a rather understudied context for
think tank scholarship.
The remaining text is structured as follows. First,
I present a short reflection on the relation between civil
society, think tanks, and elites, positioning this article in
the Thematic Issue. Second comes a background section
on the development of think tanks and civil society in
Poland, followedby a brief clarification ofwhich organiza-
tions were selected for this study and how they are ana-
lyzed. The analysis section is divided thematically in three
types of denial. In the conclusion I try to make sense of
the triple negative identification of think tanks.
2. Does Civil Society Have Elites?
Elites (from French élite, etymologically derived from
Latin ‘chosen, elected person’) can be defined as those
members of a society who hold socially privileged po-
sitions, whether in terms of wealth, political influence,
cultural prestige, social networks, knowledge, or some
other relevant assets, and who are recognized by oth-
ers as legitimately occupying such a position (Bourdieu,
1996; Jezierski, 2020). In other words, elites constitute
the hegemonic groups in a society. The notion of elite
captures the relative position of various individuals and
groups in a field. Any larger group will produce stratifica-
tion, a hierarchical order with the privileged at the top
(cf. iron law of oligarchy, Michels, 1915; Nodia, 2020).
Thus, when we zoom in on the civil society field, we will
necessarily discover differentiation between its mem-
bers, with some cherishing a more elevated status.
Contrary to the usual approach of studying elites at
the individual or group levels, the contribution of this ar-
ticle to the Thematic Issue is to interpret the theme of
civil society elites as a distinction between various orga-
nizations of civil society. Instead of focusing on the el-
evated individuals within civil society, the article stud-
ies civil society organizations that, as organizations, have
a higher standing. Seen this way, we necessarily bring
the perspective of internal conflict and struggle to the
analysis of civil society (cf. Gramsci, 1971/2005). The or-
ganizations and individuals constituting civil society do
not form a unified entity if there is social distinction and
power at stake. Moreover, we should not expect any ho-
mogeneity or coherence among the elites. Those belong-
ing to the elite (whether analyzed at the organizational
or individual level) may well be dispersed and in conflict
with each other. This is, in fact, what is more probable,
as they compete for the same type of capital.
The argument in this article departs from the obser-
vation that think tanks are among the organizations that
form the civil society elite. It is a common approach to an-
alyze think tanks as part of civil society, as a specific type
of NGO (e.g., Åberg, Einarsson, & Reuter, 2019; Jezierska,
2018; McGann & Weaver, 2000; Ohemeng, 2015; Stone,
2007). Civil society literature, on its part, often includes
think tanks as an object of study (e.g., Diamond, 1994;
Jobert & Kohler-Koch, 2008; Scholte, 2002). However, an
explicit discussion of what position think tanks occupy
with respect to the broader civil society is rather rare (but
see some comments about it in Jezierska, 2018; Klásková
&Císař, 2020; Stone, 2007). As Diane Stone (2007, p. 269)
explains:
[T]hink tanks cater primarily to the economically and
politically literate and are at some distance from the
rest of society. The people who found these insti-
tutes and the people who work in them are usually
highly educated, male, middle-class, Westernized pro-
fessionals, often from privileged backgrounds. The or-
ganizational mandates—to inform and/or influence
public policy—drives them to engage with other usu-
ally more powerful elites in society.
Hence, the contribution of this article is to bring this argu-
ment to the fore and analyze discursive means by which
think tanks elevate themselves.
3. Civil Society and Think Tanks in Poland
For any study of civil society in Poland or other Central
and Eastern European countries, the year 1989, which
officially ended the state-socialist period (1945–1989),
forms a critical juncture that cannot be ignored. It was
a clear rupture in terms of political and economic orga-
nization of these societies, but also a spark for the con-
struction of a new pluralistic public sphere. Obviously,
1989 was not a magical reset button (Iłowiecka-Tańska,
2011, p. 40), which forced all social life to organize anew.
There is enough evidence of an “incomplete,” “dissident,”
or “one-sided” civil society prior to 1989 (Buchowski,
1996; Ekiert & Kubik, 2014), the Solidarity movement be-
ing just one prominent example. Nevertheless, the post-
1989 period undoubtedly offered substantially changed
conditions and opportunities for civic action. Alongside
the plethora of informal civic initiatives, a new organi-
zational model materialized—the professionalized NGO.
The mushrooming of these organizations added up to an
“associational revolution” (Ekiert & Kubik, 2014). Thus,
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the third sector, i.e., a legally recognized, institutional-
ized, and professionalized set of NGOs was a new phe-
nomenon, while the wider civil society and civic engage-
ment obviously had a longer tradition, stretching back
to not only pre-1989 but also to before World War II
(Frączak, 2013).
The formation of this new third sector in post-state-
socialist Poland coincided with the emergence of think
tanks. Most Polish think tanks were founded in the early
years of transformation to liberal democracy and capi-
talism, i.e., in the 1990s and early 2000s. Just as in the
case of civic engagement, one might identify proto-think
tanks among organizations from the state-socialist pe-
riod. However, given the conditions of policymaking un-
der communist rule, these institutions were heavily con-
trolled by the party and did not even aspire to make
an appearance of independence. Since 1989, the plu-
ralist model has been adopted in Poland (Czaputowicz
& Stasiak, 2012), allowing for non-governmental actors’
engagement in policymaking. Just as Struyk (1999) re-
ports in his study of Bulgaria, Armenia, Russia, and
Hungary, in Poland too the support from Western gov-
ernments and foundations for think tanks and NGOs
more broadly was apparent from the first months of
the transition. After the first wave of think tanks were
launched in the early to mid-1990s their number oscil-
lated at around 40, whichwas in the top tier in the region.
Among the more visible think tanks during that time
were CASE—Center for Social and Economic Research
(Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych), founded in
Warsaw in 1991, and Institute for Market Economy
Research (Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową),
founded in Gdańsk in 1989. Both specialize in eco-
nomic analysis and have been rather active in promot-
ing the neoliberal orientation of reforms in Poland as
well as in other Central European countries (cf. Krastev,
2000). Their successes were clearly shown by the hege-
monic discourse of “no alternative” to the shock therapy
style of transition (e.g., Ost, 2000; Woś, 2014). Another
important institution from that early period is Batory
Foundation (Fundacja Batorego) launched in Warsaw in
1988. Batory quickly became the go-to foundation sup-
porting a variety of newly created NGOs in Poland and
beyond. It also developed its own in-house social analy-
sis unit, assisting transition to an open, liberal society, in
line with the will of its founder, George Soros.
A second stage in the development of the Polish
think tank landscape came around 2015, when the
nationalist right-wing party Law and Justice (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość) came to power, initiating a so-called sec-
ond transition to ‘illiberal democracy.’ As of 2020, there
are approximately 60 think tanks in the country. Many of
the new organizations share the ruling party’s ideologi-
cal orientation and push it to promote conservative and
Catholic policy solutions. The Institute for Legal Culture
Ordo Iuris (Instytut na Rzecz Kultury Prawnej Ordo Iuris)
is the prime example here. It was founded in 2013 and
has been very active both in Poland and internation-
ally (e.g., at the UN fora), proclaiming for instance anti-
abortion and anti-LGBT regulations.
In effect, the Polish think tank landscape is composed
of quite varied institutions. Polish think tanks cover a
broad ideological spectrum from the left to the right and
they showcase diversity with respect to funding sources
and size (Jezierska, in press). Compared to the more
known cases from the Anglophone world, the actual in-
volvement of Polish think tanks in policymaking is rather
limited however (Biskup & Schöll-Mazurek, 2018; Cadier
& Sus, 2017). There are surely some spectacular cases of
successes in promoting given policy solutions, also by the
above-mentioned think tanks, but on the whole, Polish
think tanks lack systematic access channels to policy-
makers. Those who succeed need to be resourceful and
find non-given paths to the ears of powerholders. Think-
tankers usually blame their relatively meagre impact on
the “immaturity” of the Polish political class (Jezierska,
2020), which results in policymakers only sporadically
resorting to external policy advice. Nevertheless, think
tanks have become given players on the Polish political
scene and some of them manage to gain quite a lot of
public attention.
In contrast to the vast literature on think tanks
in the Anglophone world, especially in the US, the
focus on think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe
has so far attracted much less scholarly consideration.
There is, however, a growing number of studies ranging
from inventorial reports to more analytical approaches
(on Central and Eastern Europe see e.g., Bigday, 2020;
Jezierska & Giusti, 2020; Keudel & Carbou, 2020; Kimball,
2000; Klásková & Císař, 2020; Krastev, 2000; Sandle,
2004; Schneider, 2002; Struyk, 1999; and specifically on
Poland see Bąkowski & Szlachetko, 2012; Biskup& Schöll-
Mazurek, 2018; Cadier & Sus, 2017; Czaputowicz &
Stasiak, 2012; Hess, 2013; Jezierska, 2015, 2018, 2020a,
2020b; Zbieranek, 2011; Ziętara, 2010). This article builds
on findings from this research and contributes the per-
spective on Polish think tanks as a civil society elite.
4. Data and Methods
There is no unequivocal definition of a think tank in the
literature. The characteristics of think tanks most com-
monly pointed out are engagement in policy advice, inde-
pendence from governments, and social interests such
as firms, interest groups, and political parties as well as
a non-profit character (e.g., Abelson, 2009; Rich, 2004;
Stone, 2000; Weaver, 1989; Weaver & McGann, 2000).
All these attributes can be questioned in any given study
of think tanks. Some think tanks are government institu-
tions, some are party affiliated, other are sponsored by
business organizations. Many institutions do conduct for-
profit activities to diversify their funding and secure re-
sources for the costly policy analysis. This makes think
tanks a loosely defined organizational type. Following
common praxis, this article departs from a working def-
inition where think tanks are understood as civil soci-
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ety organizations that claim independence (but do not
actually have to be independent) and attempt to influ-
ence policymaking (succeeding to varying degrees in this
endeavor) based on the social analysis they produce.
This definition is deliberately kept open to capture dif-
ferent declinations of the think tank model. Thus, the
crucial aspects that helped identify the objects of this
study are the research/analysis component in the orga-
nization, activities aiming at policy influence and claims
to independence.
The selected sample of think tanks includes nine
organizations (Batory Foundation, Civic Institute, Civil
Development Forum, Ferdinand Lassalle Centre for
Social Thought, Green Institute, Political Critique,
Sobieski Institute, The Institute of Public Affairs, and
The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard)
out of 40 existing at the time (2013). Hence, the data ad-
dresses the Polish think tank landscape at the end of its
first stage of development (1989–2015), i.e., before the
coming to power of the Law and Justice party. While the
conditions for think tanks in Poland have changed after
2015, it is mostly visible in power shifts within the think
tank community, with organizations previously marginal-
ized now gaining traction because they support the ide-
ological line of the ruling party and major organizations
pre-2015 having problems with obtaining state-funded
grants. It means that the analysis presented here, focus-
ing on identification of think tanks as a specific type of
organization, applies to the currently reconfigured space
of think tanks as well.
All organizations selected for this study fulfill the
working definition criteria and figure in previous litera-
ture as think tanks, even though, as we will see in the
analysis, some deny identification with the think tank
community. The sample was constructed to represent
the Polish think tank population at the time. This means,
for instance, that all but one of the studied organiza-
tions are located in the capital. To capture the diversity
of the Polish think tanks, the sampled organizations vary
in terms of ideological leaning (from the leftist Political
Critique, the neoliberal Civil Development Forum, to the
conservative Sobieski Institute), organizational age (e.g.,
Batory Foundation founded in 1988, Institute of Public
Affairs founded in 1995, and Civil Institute founded in
2010), size of the budget and staff (e.g., Sobieski Institute
with four employees and a budget below EUR 500,000,
Institute of Public Affairs with 25 employees and a bud-
get of almost EUR 2 million), as well as different areas of
specialization (e.g., cultural policy for Political Critique,
environmental policy for Green Institute, economic pol-
icy for Civil Development Forum, and a broad spectrum
of policies for the Institute of Public Affairs).
It can be debated what constitutes the identity of
an organization, whether it should be identified through
how the leader defines the organization, or through the
aggregated sense of identity of the staff. For the pur-
pose of this article, I approach organizational identity
through an interrogation of key figures in these organi-
zations. Hence, the data consist of interviews with think
tank leaders, i.e., those who have the power to strate-
gically position the organization closer or further away
from various surrounding actors (cf. van Knippenberg,
2016). In the case of bigger organizations, additional in-
terviews were conducted with project leaders to cap-
ture a more comprehensive picture and make sure the
individual identity narrative of the leader did not take
over the organizational perspective. In total, 16 quali-
tative semi-structured interviews with Polish think tank
leaders were conducted. Each interview lasted about an
hour. In line with the informed consent, each conversa-
tion was recorded, transcribed, and translated to English
by the author. It was made clear to the interviewees
that they were expected to reflect upon their organiza-
tion’s position with regard to other fields, not their indi-
vidual positioning.
The analysis of the data followed the standard pro-
cedure of qualitative content analysis (e.g., Mayring,
2004), with thematic coding of the interview material.
The qualitative approach to data gathering and analy-
sis has implications for the generalizability of the find-
ings. While simple extrapolation to other contexts is not
advised, it does not mean that the results presented
here are purely idiosyncratic. Generalizability in qualita-
tive research comes from the “fit of the topic or the
comparability of the problem that is of concern” (Morse,
1999, p. 6). While the purposeful composition of the
sample is obviously not representative in the statistical
sense, it nevertheless captures the variety of positions
that brings forth a comprehensive and credible identity
narrative of Polish think tanks. Moreover, the issues re-
lated to the positioning of think tanks with regard to
other civil society organizations and the specific interme-
diary role think tanks play is shared by this type of or-
ganization beyond Poland. Previous scholarship has con-
vincingly argued that think tanks are best understood
as boundary organizations (Medvetz, 2012b). This arti-
cle analyzes what implications this intermediary posi-
tion has for think tank identity and in this sense the re-
sults apply beyond the immediate case analyzed here.
There are scattered comments in the literature indicating
that this claim is substantiated. For instance, a study of
Canadian think tanks (Lindquist, 1989) notes that think-
tankers at times object to being classified as such. A re-
cent article on Swedish and Polish think tanks (Jezierska
& Sörbom, 2020) singles out distancing from various ac-
tors, including civil society, as one fundamental mecha-
nismbywhich these organizationswish to secure the per-
ception of independence. The analysis in this article con-
centrates on one discursive strategy, i.e., denial, that I ar-
gue springs from the intermediary position of think tanks
and helps them affirm their elevated position through
distancing from other actors. The Polish case should be
seen as an illustration of the specific arguments think-
tankers use to maneuver their identity, putting forth spe-
cific denials of identification with civil society, with think
tanks and with the elite.
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5. Three Types of Denial
5.1. Denial 1: Not Civil Society
In Poland, think tanks fall into the same legal category as
other NGOs, thus being part of the third sector. Just like
other NGOs, they register as either associations or foun-
dations. However, the interviewed organizations display
ambiguity with respect to a civil society identity. To mark
their adherence to civil society, some of the interviewed
think tanks use the label of ‘think-and-do tank.’ This is
a way of stressing the activist component of what they
do, combining advocacy and expert functions with di-
rect community engagement (Jezierska, 2020). One think-
tanker even argued that her organization is akin to a so-
cial movement: “Our aim was basically to combine the
intellectual dimension with a social movement” (Political
Critique). While this is a rather unusual claim, a recurring
theme in the interviews was the desire to make a tangi-
ble impact on social life, by engaging in testing or imple-
menting their proposed policy solutions. This positions
the studied organisations in proximity to other NGOs:
[We] engage in social campaigning, realized in part-
nership with other organizations, which are NGOs but
not think tanks. We subscribe to and feel like we are
a part of this community. We don’t want to be the
know-it-alls who sit on the sidelines and say [what to
do]. (Institute of Public Affairs)
Contrary to the perception of think tanks as distanced
experts who deliver recommendations for action, here
the drive to be active and connected to other NGOs was
stressed. At the same time, think tanks’ position with re-
spect to the broader civil society is ambiguous. The inter-
viewees recognize the formal categorization of their or-
ganizations as part of the third sector, even though their
identity is often detached from it. The CEO of a leftist
think tank clarifies:
The natural legal form of a think tank is an association,
so in this way, I am part of the third sector. But I never
had a need to work in the sector; what I wanted to do
happened to be formally situated in the third sector.
(Lassalle Centre for Social Thought)
The CEO from the conservative Sobieski Institute argues
even more forcefully: “I don’t see myself as a worker
in the third sector. The third sector has connotations
that I don’t identify with.” The distance to the third sec-
tor is emphasized and the distinctiveness of think tanks
as professionalized knowledge producers and experts is
highlighted. As the CEO from amajor center-liberal think
tank explains:
My dilemma was to choose an academic career or
something else, so, frankly, I rather chose to work in
a think tank than in the third sector.
So do you define it as something separate?
It wasn’t obvious to me that I would work in the third
sector. Think tanks were actually things that were
slightly off to the side. (Institute of Public Affairs)
While the above quotes can be read as reflections about
personal career trajectories, expressing the habitus of
think tank leaders, they also reveal organizational iden-
tify. As the rich organizational literature has it, when it
comes to identity the individual and organizational lev-
els are closely intertwined (e.g., Dejordy & Creed, 2016)
and especially in the case of leaders, their perceptions
of what a think tank is has huge impact on how they
position the organization, its distance, or closeness to
other actors.
Think tanks apparently havemixed identities and am-
bitions. Being “slightly off to the side,” they both are and
are not part of civil society. Denying a civil society iden-
tity is a way to carve their distinctive space in the socio-
political landscape. What the interviewed organizations
claim distinguishes think tanks from other NGOs are the
intellectual ambition and research component of their
activity, as well as the drive to engage in policymaking.
5.2. Denial 2: Not Think Tanks
As discussed above, the interviewed organizations am-
biguously relate to the civil society field by stressing
that their identity as think tanks takes priority. It might
then seem slightly paradoxical that they, at times, also
deny being think tanks. In the analyzed data, this second
type of denial comes from two opposing positions. The
interviewed organizations either pointed out their or-
ganizational deficiencies, which allegedly prevent them
from living up to the think tank label, or conversely,
they elevated themselves and dismissively talked about
think tanks as organizations they do not want to be con-
flated with.
Not displaying a clear-cut think tank identity is ex-
plained by the necessity to engage in multiple tasks and
not being able to keep the focus on what is perceived
as the main think tank activity. This impurity of focus is
mostly blamed on problemswith securing stable funding
over time:
As a pure think tank, it [the Institute of Public Affairs]
would never survive, it wouldn’t have enough finan-
cial means for the activities, so unfortunately, we
need to reach out for different projects. We are care-
ful to always have a research component, but it’s of-
ten simply concrete engagement [konkretne działa-
nia]. (Institute of Public Affairs)
Here, again, the distinction between civil society and
think tank functions is underscored and the very fact of
mixing them is used to argue for an insufficiently pure
think tank identity. The interviewees seem to believe
that these problems are unique for the Polish context:
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Here [in Poland] it’s very difficult to keep the [think
tank] structure, and most of these organizations sim-
ply vegetate, taking on whatever they want or, rather,
whatever they can. The Institute [of Public Affairs]
also endedup there—”Wedo some training and some
grant-giving because there was money for organiza-
tions dealingwith legal help.” The institutions become
hybrids, not like in the West. (Batory Foundation)
While in other contexts funding might indeed be more
readily available for think tanks (e.g., due to more de-
veloped philanthropy), hybridity is discussed in the aca-
demic literature as a typical feature of think tanks (e.g.,
Medvetz, 2012b; Stone, 2007). In the eyes of the inter-
viewees, however, the impurity of focus on policy analy-
sis and advice sets the Polish institutions apart, making
them not fully think tanks. The dispute over what consti-
tutes a think tank and how to identify one is apparently
something the interviewees struggle with as well:
The hybrids emerge, like Shipyard and Political
Critique [both interviewed for this study], with all
their dissociating from being a think tank, they ac-
tually do, from time to time, put on the think tank
hat. They also deal with policy issues; they aren’t non-
think tanks. It’s apparent that this clear-cut distinction
is being erased. (Institute of Public Affairs)
As noted, impurity is partly blamed on financial insta-
bility. Most Polish think tanks rely on short-term public
and private grants (Jezierska, in press), forcing them to
take on varied tasks. Yet another factor that the intervie-
wees list as seemingly disqualifying their organization as
a think tank is insufficient academic credentials: “In fact,
we couldn’t competewith formal think tanks becausewe
don’t have thiswhole establishmentwith all the degrees”
(Shipyard). Interestingly, we know from empirical find-
ings from other contexts that even though conducting
policy research is a necessary component of a think tank,
it is present to a varying degree. To capture this variance
in think tanks’ dedication to research, only some orga-
nizations that have a significant number of academically
accredited staffers and primarily produce academic-like
book-length publications are dubbed “universities with-
out students” (Weaver, 1989). For most think tanks, im-
purity of focus is a defining characteristic coming from
their specific boundary position.
Some other interviewees stressed alterity with re-
gard to the think tank identification aiming at positive
distinction. Independence and the ambition of the inter-
viewed organizations to initiate new debates were listed
as elements that seemingly distance them from a think
tank identity. Again, these qualities are usually included
as core characteristics (or aspirations) of a think tank but
were presented by these interviewees as something dis-
tinguishing their organization from, in this account, a neg-
atively viewed ‘real think tank’:
That is, we for sure cherish more agency [pod-
miotowość] and feel more sovereign because think
tanks are often linked to someone else, usually some-
one stands behind them. We have nobody behind
us, and we’re not anybody’s instrument; this is how
I’d put it. This is one thing, and another is the level
of operating. Think tanks are more at the instrumen-
tal level, not truly creating completely new ideas but
rather ascribing a certain ideology to given interests.
(Political Critique)
Here, the perspective discussed above, in which a lack of
identification with think tanks is explained by Polish in-
stitutions being insufficient in terms of their purity of fo-
cus, is reversed. What we see, in contrast, is a pejorative
view of think tanks, while the interviewed organization
conveys a more ambitious and independent image, look-
ing down on think tanks and distancing itself from these
institutions. In both cases, the denial is clear.
In a study of Canadian think tanks, Lindquist (1989)
observes their reluctance to take on the think tank la-
bel noting several cases where respondents claim that
they do more than ‘think.’ Apparently, particular motiva-
tions for denying a think tank identity might differ, but
this type of denial seems to transcend the Polish case.
5.3. Denial 3: Not Elite
With regard to measures such as budget size (economic
capital) and formal qualifications of the staff (educa-
tional capital), think tanks clearly place themselves in the
upper tier of the civil society field. Despite some varia-
tion in budget sizes between Polish think tanks, the avail-
able assets of even the ‘poorest’ think tanks place them
among the ‘richest’ NGOs in the country (cf. Jezierska, in
press). According to a recent report (Klon/Jawor, 2019),
in 2018 only 6% of all Polish NGOs operated with bud-
gets bigger than EUR 230,000 (PLN 1 million), while all
but two think tanks in this study exceed a EUR 500,000
budget. This is not surprising, given the fact that policy
analysis and advice are expensive activities. They both re-
quire highly qualified staff and often long-term commit-
ment to analysis on which policy recommendations are
based. Higher education is generally correlated with en-
gagement in civil society (Czapiński & Panek, 2015), but
even here think tanks stand out with respect to other
NGOs, showcasing a higher level of academic credentials,
which is the source of their expert image.
Apart from their main activities, i.e., attempts at di-
rectly or indirectly influencing policymakers based on the
social analysis they produce, think tanks sometimes take
an explicit leadership role with regard to the civil soci-
ety in Poland. They often have “promotion of civil soci-
ety” or “development of the public sphere” in their mis-
sion statements (Jezierska, 2018), thus positioning them-
selves as initiators or moderators of these entities. Think
tanks also provide training, distribute funding, and offer
other types of support for smaller NGOs. These functions
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might be read as an embracement of the civil society
elite role.
However, rather than self-identifying as a civil soci-
ety elite, think-tankers repeatedly stress their interme-
diary position between different elites. Having access
to academia, civil society, media, and politics, they see
themselves as enablers, mediators, or “vehicles of the
articulation of elites…a machine to build social contact”
(Sobieski Institute). They point to their function of con-
necting elites. Being partly associated with various fields,
they accumulate and convert economic, academic and
media capital into political capital using advocacy and
networking as conversion tools (cf. Keudel & Carbou,
2020). Thus, they become translators, brokers, or con-
verters of the different forms of capital at stake in the
surrounding fields. Their unique interstitial position al-
lows think tanks to play the role of “mapping and gath-
ering elites—people with knowledge, engagement, and
contacts” (Sobieski Institute).
Asked about their target audience, the interviewees
point to political, business, and media elites, the ones
who decide the shape of a society. The role of think tanks,
according to a leftist think tank, is to “put pressure on
the political and economic elites to change their way of
thinking” (Political Critique), which is the only way (pro-
gressive) social change can happen. Think tanks present
themselves as crucial agents of change having enough or-
ganizational capacity and access to “people on important
positions” (Sobieski Institute). They stress their interac-
tions with elites, who are identified elsewhere.
With regard to budget size, formal qualifications of
their staff and type of activity they perform (functions to-
wards smaller organizations), Polish think tanks occupy
a leading position with respect to Polish civil society. At
the same time, they are also detached from civil soci-
ety in the sense that they do not claim to represent a
broader constituency, or any specific group in civil soci-
ety. Their “assertion of a voice in the policy-making pro-
cess is based on their claim to expertise rather than as a
vox populi” (Weaver &McGann, 2000, p. 17). Think tanks
claim to serve ideas, not members or followers (or fun-
ders), which creates distance between them and other
NGOs. “NGOs may therefore view the ‘research commu-
nity’ negatively: elite, exclusive and with insubstantial
connections to the general public” (Stone, 2007, p. 270).
Think tanks are closely tied with other elites and are
viewed by others as an elite, but they do not themselves
identify as constituting an elite. Instead, they see their
role as putting pressure on elites, mediating between dif-
ferent elite types and converting various forms of capi-
tal. It should be noted that the usually pejorative descrip-
tions of elitism and elitist (Williams, 2015) obviously influ-
ence any groups’ propensity to self-identify as an elite.
6. Conclusion
This article focused on the self-identification of Polish
think tanks. A comprehensive study of elites should in-
clude both the self-perceptions and means adopted to
gain the privileged status as well as legitimation proce-
dures, i.e., processes through which other groups and in-
dividuals in the field legitimize and counter the elevated
position of the elite (Jezierski, 2020). The latter, however,
is left for future studies to explore. The argument in this
article, investigating self-identification only, is not that
all Polish think tanks express all three types of denial.
Some of them do, while others stress one of the types
and perceive the other identifications as less problem-
atic. Nevertheless, seen collectively, as the space of think
tanks, the ambiguous positioning with respect to other
fields emerges as an important characteristic of think
tanks. This ambiguity is also reflected in the lack of defi-
nitional clarity in the academic literature on think tanks.
There is no widely accepted definition of think tanks and
scholars often resort to working definitions to make em-
pirical studies feasible.
What unites all think tanks is their interstitial position.
They occupy the space in-between the fields of politics,
media, academia, and civil society. Such a position grants
them the role of intermediaries—being the ones who un-
derstand and to some extent incorporate the logics of
all those fields, they are not engaged in one field only.
As intermediaries, think tanks convert different types of
capital, becoming translators or brokers. Their elevated
position is not based on the number of members or fol-
lowers, but rather on the capacity to formulate policy
recommendations or discourse around a policy issue in
such a way that it gets traction among decision makers
and/or the broader public. This is facilitated through a
think tank’s academic credentials―which give them the
image of experts―through their fluency in themedia lan-
guage which allows them to formulate their recommen-
dations as soundbites, through their links to civil society
which makes these recommendations appear as disinter-
ested and non-for-profit, and through their contacts in
policy circles―which grant them access to those who
make political decisions. The interstitial position, how-
ever, is both the very key to think tanks’ unique role and
what complicates their (self-)identification. To grasp who
they are and to carve out a sufficiently distinctive iden-
tity multiple points of reference are needed. The Polish
example provides an illustration of what the intermedi-
ary role of think tanks entails for their identity with de-
nial of identification with various fields as a discursive
strategy to deal with the interstitial position. Based on
sporadic comments from previous literature, we can in-
fer that this is not a unique trait and strategy for Polish
think tanks. However,more studies on other contexts are
needed, also to verify whether the specific arguments
used by Polish think tanks are unique.
This article analyzed three types of denial, which
I contend are central to a think tank identity. The stud-
ied Polish think tanks deny their identification with civil
society, with the think tank community and with being a
(civil society) elite. If we follow Bourdieu (1996), claims
to being “beyond all definition” are indicative of elites.
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Although some recognition and visibility are needed to at-
tract funders, to someextent think tanks also need to stay
obscure, which helps themexert policy influencewithout
attracting toomuch attention and calls for accountability.
The rhetorical moves of denial can also be seen as an ex-
pression of what Cynthia Weber (2016) calls a “plural fig-
ure” that defies categorization as either/or.Weber (2016)
sought to describe a pluralized masculine and/or femi-
nine identification. In the case of think tanks, plurality
refers to identifications with roles, functions, and logics
of the multiple fields in which think tanks are immersed,
while defying any simple ascription to a single field.
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